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Abstract
This paper uses a case-study approach to describe how or-
ganizational characteristics may influence program out-
comes in humanitarian aid situations. Organizational
structure and human resource management are discussed
as organizational factors that influence the vulnerabilities
of clients and employees. Interview and archival data
from a program on reintegrating refugee and internally
displaced women and girl survivors of sexual violence in
Sierra Leone and observations based on the author’s expe-
rience with the organization provides a relevant basis for
isolating the firm as an important context within which
refugee programs are embedded.
Résumé
Cet article utilise une approche d’étude de cas pour dé-
crire comment les caractéristiques organisationnelles peu-
vent influencer les résultats de programmes dans des
situations d’aide humanitaire. La structure organisation-
nelle et la gestion des ressources humaines sont exami-
nées en tant que facteurs organisationnels ayant un
impact sur les vulnérabilités des clients et des employés.
Des informations provenant d’entrevues, ainsi que des
données de documents d’archives, le tout faisant partie
d’un programme du Sierra Leone pour la réintégration
de femmes réfugiées et déplacées à l’intérieur des frontiè-
res et de filles rescapées de violences sexuelles, ajoutées aux
observations issues de l’expérience de l’auteure au sein de
l’organisation, fournissent un fondement pertinent pour
désigner l’organisation comme contexte important où
sont ancrés des programmes pour réfugiés.
F
rom naïve (though dedicated) individuals committed
only to “doing good,” international humanitarian aid
workers have evolved into sophisticated thinkers em-
bracing the  adjoining principle  as well: “do no harm.”1
However, the complexities of humanitarian aid ensure that
“doing no harm” is not a simple, linear principle that merely
needs to be implemented by individuals “on the ground.”
Both aid workers and clients are embedded in a web of
organizations such as donors, competitors, governments,
and collaborators that influence the vulnerabilities of clients
both positively and negatively. The critical actor in the web
of organizations is the actual NGO in which the aid worker
is employed: the organization which is developing and ad-
ministering the program for the clients. From a practical
perspective, those who work in development organizations
are aware of both the opportunities and limitations that
working in their specific NGOs can provide. However, from
a theoretical perspective, the actual role of the organization
in influencing outcomes that both practitioners and theo-
rists care about is not well understood. Becoming more
aware of specific characteristics of NGOs doing humanitar-
ian aid work is important because of the impact of these
factors on the vulnerabilities of both aid workers and clients.
Research on NGOs in conflict currently tends to examine
NGOs as group. Thus, Anderson’s2 exhortation to “Do No
Harm” targeted all NGOs operating in conflict and at-
tempted to explain how NGOs in general could uninten-
tionally affect conflict processes. Likewise, Aall3 and Last4
discuss NGOs as a group of players active in international
conflict situations. More recently, Berinstain5 described the
pros and cons of NGOs in humanitarian aid and develop-
ment, again focusing on NGOs as a group of organizational
players in the field of humanitarian aid. This emphasis on
group-level characteristics and influence was important in
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the 1980s and 1990s as we observed the astonishing growth
in NGOs as a class of organizations.6 However, it may now
be opportune to turn attention, in both theory and practice,
towards specific characteristics within the group of NGOs
that can have important implications for workers and cli-
ents. Although most practitioners and researchers would
acknowledge important differences among NGOs and ac-
cept that NGOs rarely act in concert and rarely have similar
capacities and resources, there is little theory or empirical
research on  the  particular characteristics of NGOs  that
might help explain project outcomes or their impact on
peace.
This paper focuses on a single program within one or-
ganization to describe how organizational characteristics,
specifically organizational structure and human resource
management, interacted to influence the outcomes of a
program to reintegrate women and girl survivors of sexual
violence in Sierra Leone. The first section of the paper
provides a brief background on the Sierra Leone conflict.
The second section provides an introduction to the organi-
zation and the organization’s program, which was targeted
towards refugees and internally displaced women and girls.
The third section reviews the data utilized to analyze pro-
gram outcomes. Based on the data, it is argued that both
organizational structure and human resource management
issues are implicated in the implementation of the program.
The implications of this case study are relevant to donors,
NGO managers, and workers in humanitarian aid situ-
ations; organizational management can be a critical risk
factor influencing clients’ psychosocial outcomes and
should be closely monitored and improved. The study also
emphasizes the need for researchers on NGOs in conflict to
begin examining organizational-level variables, such as
structure, culture, and human resource management.
Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict: A
Brief Summary
The war in Sierra Leone lasted from about 1991 to 2002, with
various coups and times of stability in those eleven years. In
all, the war is thought to have resulted in about 50,000 dead.
However,  the  number of  refugees  is about 400,000 and
internally displaced persons (IDPs) anywhere from 300,000
(registered) to 1 million (unregistered).7 The number of IDP
women suffering from war-related sexual assault is about
50,000 to 64,000 women; if one counts both war and non-
war related sexual assault, the estimates are over 200,000
women survivors.8 According to the same study, the preva-
lence rate of war-related sexual assault committed by com-
batants in Sierra Leone is 8 to 9 per cent.9
Carolyn McAskie, former United Nations Emergency
Relief Coordinator, reported in April 2000 that team mem-
bers of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL) deployed to the northern region  of Sierra
Leone were finding a higher incidence of women raped
there than in Bosnia, where rape has been considered a war
crime and where just recently sexual slavery was recognized
as torture. In Sierra Leone, countless young girls and
women were taken by combatants as sex slaves or “soldier’s
wives” and raped repeatedly for months or even years; these
women have been subjected to astounding levels of sexual
violence. In 2001, Human Rights Watch interviewed six
women who had been raped and numerous more who were
either held or taken away to rebel bases, for a time span
varying from a few hours to several weeks.10 The pattern of
gender violence has continued in the post-war situation as
well. Returning combatants and other males highly trau-
matized by the years of constant exposure to violence and
violent behaviour resort to sexual abuse and violence on the
domestic front.
Organizational Background: Training
International
Training International (TI)11 is a US-based capacity building
and sustainable development organization. Founded in
1970 by a leader in the civil rights movement, TI’s mission
is in the arena of human resource development, including
skills training in vocational skills and agriculture as well as
skills particular to the context of each country in which it
works. TI is organized with a US-based headquarters and
country affiliates. Unlike many other organizations, TI’s
country affiliates are independent, locally managed non-
profit organizations. In the last decade, due to the needs of
TI affiliates in conflict-ridden countries, TI headquarters has
provided assistance in conflict resolution, demobilization,
and reintegration of ex-combatants, psychosocial counsel-
ling, and microcredit for those affected by war.
Traditionally, the local affiliates were the conduits for
project management. People in the local communities
knew of their TI chapter as a local skills training organiza-
tion, not necessarily as the branch of an international or-
ganization. The staff and management of the local TI
affiliate were long-term employees of the organization and
local projects would be run by the local TI affiliate. Inter-
national projects always came through the TI headquarters
but were channelled through  the local TI  affiliate.  The
affiliates thus provided the access, knowledge, and man-
power to implement the projects, while TI headquarters
provided the international legitimacy and management so
both the headquarters and the affiliate were able to access
international aid money.
The affiliate in Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone Training In-
ternational (TI-SL), has been established since the late
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1970s and currently has four training centres in different
parts of the country. Traditionally, TI-SL offered training
in skills such as carpentry, masonry, agricultural produc-
tion, tailoring, and secretarial skills. In the early nineties,
due to the outbreak of civil conflict in Sierra Leone and
neighbouring Liberia, TI-SL with the assistance of TI has
conducted demobilization, reintegration, and resettlement
programs for ex-combatants, child soldiers, and war wid-
ows. From 1996, TI-SL began conducting training work-
shops to help prepare lay counsellors to assist persons
severely affected by war in rebuilding their emotional and
psychological health and their home communities. TI-SL
has also emphasized agricultural and entrepreneurial train-
ing so individuals could learn to survive in the non-formal
economy. In early 2000 TI-SL started offering shorter
courses and extension services specifically for women and
other vulnerable, displaced, and impoverished community
members in rural areas.
The Program: Reintegration of Women and Girl
Survivors of Gender-Based Violence in Sierra
Leone
The program under study was initiated in 2003 by Training
International, and funding was received from two US-based
donor organizations. The program was intended to be a
reintegration program for refugee and internally displaced
women and girl survivors of gender-based violence in Sierra
Leone. The design followed current best practices in offering
psychosocial as well as economic assistance for refugees and
the internally displaced. The program design consisted of
three main components – skills training, business develop-
ment training, and psychosocial counseling. The program
was intended to run for one year with approximately six
months of skills training and six months of business devel-
opment assistance. Counselling would continue throughout
the length of the program.12
The program took place in three locations, Bo, Mattru
Jong, and Makeni. The participants were recruited through
local organizations, using TI-SL’s regular practices. There
were seventy-five participants and in addition a training-
of-trainers workshop was held for thirteen female counsel-
lors from local organizations working with survivors of
sexual violence. Four counsellors were also appointed to the
program. These counsellors were all Sierra Leonean women
themselves and had considerable experience working with
women and children who survived the war.
The general patterns of sexual violence and abuse dis-
cussed above were also reflected in the women who partici-
pated in this program. Of the seventy-five women who
participated, twenty-five of the women, all from Mattru
Jong, were forced to stay in rebel camps, from nine months
to four years. Two-thirds of the Bo women stayed in camps,
most from one to two years. For the Mattru Jong group,
they experienced sexual abuse anywhere from several
months to over a year. For the Bo group, abuse typically
lasted several weeks, while for the Makeni group, abuse
lasted over a year for most, but less than one week for some.
Nearly all the women reported being either raped or gang-
raped, while molestation and sexual slavery were reported
by about half of the women.13
Program Outcomes
This paper uses a single case study approach to understand
the particular organizational influences in the organization
on the program described above. The time period under
study is from late 2002 to 2004. During this time period, the
program under study was initially proposed and launched.
Data sources consisted of organizational documents related
to the project including reports and correspondence sent to
the donors, internal project evaluations that formed some
of the source material for donor reports, internal correspon-
dence regarding the project, and the original project pro-
posal. Personal observations based on the author’s
experience with the organization and interviews with em-
ployees were also used to supplement this data. Given the
sensitive nature of the data, and to protect confidentiality,
all names of individuals and the organization have been
altered.
The goal of this paper is not to use detailed and case-based
information to generate theory. For that a much “thicker”
description would be necessary. As a case study, the paper has
the aim of generating discussion for practitioners and theorists
about the importance of organizational- level factors in under-
standing humanitarian aid work. Examining closely the po-
tential factors at an organizational level that may impede
rather than enhance attempts at refugee assistance may be
applicable to other organizations as well.
The major theme that emerged from the data regarding
program outcomes was the extent to which the negative
effects of the program were centred upon program manage-
ment and administration rather than training or counsel-
ling. Overall, the outcomes of the program were largely seen
as mixed; some positive but many negative impressions
were conveyed by clients. The program had three sets of
clients. First, TI-SL was a client of TI; second, the refugees
and internally displaced women were the clients for TI-SL;
and third, the counsellors for the women were also clients
of TI-SL during an initial training program, before a few of
them became employees.
The positive remarks noted about the program had to do
with the actual training and counselling received. For ex-
ample, during interviews with the refugee and internally
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displaced women in August 2003, the author found that
many  of the women  were extremely positive about  the
opportunity to participate in the program.14 In a report to
the donors:
None of the clients interviewed said they had any prob-
lems from the training or counseling. There was near unan-
imous agreement that counselors were helpful, trustworthy
and extremely caring and supportive. In interview after
interview clients expressed their appreciation for either the
counselors or the training program itself. There was high
satisfaction with the materials, curriculum and teaching
method. Evidence of the women’s grasp of their technical
or life skills knowledge was reflected in several ways: (i)
They wrote their names, knitted or told me of the basic
execution of building a house in response; (ii) Many of the
women interviewed directly made the connection between
the counseling and their ability to learn and feel confident
about taking control of  their lives;  and  (iii)  Many saw
changes in their own confidence and abilities reflected in
changes in the people around them, especially better treat-
ment from their communities and families.15
For instance, in Bo, one participant mentioned that a few
ex-combatants (who were also in the training centre)
helped them out with lunch money16.
The counsellors who were interviewed also noted that
they felt positively about their training and ability to work
with women. Hawa, one of the counsellors, gave an exam-
ple in the mid-term interviews of how she had been able to
extend her work in her neighbourhood and help local
couples where there is domestic abuse. Another counsellor
gave the example of two women who felt that they could
testify before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
after joining the program and talking to the counsellors.
The counsellor counted this as a testament to the program’s
ability to help these women.17
However, the negative remarks all centred upon the
financial obligation of the program to the clients. As many
who work with refugees in situations of conflict under-
stand, meeting basic needs is of primary importance in any
program. Furthermore, keeping trust and meeting expec-
tations lays the groundwork for the effectiveness of any
program. However, as the excerpts below show, the lack of
follow-through on the financial obligations to clients had a
devastating effect on the program:
In August of that year:
The clients’ major complaints were regarding financial support
to help meet basic health needs; graduation ceremony expenses;
and reintegration kits.18
Finally, the women all had questions regarding their reintegra-
tion kits. It was decided that these will be disbursed before the
end of October. With these packages, the women can begin their
self-employment activities, the final phase of this project.19
However, this last issue regarding the reintegration kits
came up again later in the documents, at the end of October
2003 from the president of TI-SL.
This is a personal note requesting information on the Project. I
sincerely wish to know what has happened or is happening that
we cannot get the funds. … At the moment I am under a lot of
pressure from all concerned, Trainees, Counselors and staff. I
have run out of excuses to a point that I am even afraid and
ashamed of going to the centres. [At] our last Board meeting …
the Trainees embarrassed me in the presence of Board Members
that we have lied to them about resettlement kits. …. The problem
I have now is the unavailability of funds. Please, please treat this
urgently [emphasis added].20
And from the final report to donors:
Among the negative findings of the evaluation was the judg-
ment that the project suffered from delays in fund transfers to
TI-SL, and this was a shared managerial lapse both of TI-SL and
of TI. In fact the lateness of reports from TI-SL meant that the
last wire transfer to them occurred after the project’s end date
of September 30, 2003, despite the fact that project activities
were ongoing. TI had known as early as February that the
implementation schedule was behind, and requested a no-cost
extension … in July 30, 2003.21
As is apparent from the above quotes, two sets of clients,
TI-SL and the program’s participants, felt a severe impact
based on the program management. For survivors of sexual
abuse, violence, and war, trust is a critical issue. Prior work
on conflict management is most emphatic on the impor-
tance of trust between aid workers and clients22 and the
importance of this trust for conflict transformation. If par-
ticipants felt they were deceived by the organization, this
would erode the fragile trust between employees and cli-
ents, impeding the work of the organization and the posi-
tive impact of the program for the client. Second, the bond
of trust and shared goals between TI-SL and TI is also
impaired. Again, prior research on partnerships between
Northern and Southern NGOs points to the importance of
power and trust in the asymmetrical relationships between
partners.23
Volume 25 Refuge Number 1
38
Organizational Characteristics: Structure and
Human Resource Management
The program evaluations above point towards two poten-
tially important organizational variables at TI that could
have influenced program implementation and outcomes in
Sierra Leone. The first is TI’s organizational structure. As is
apparent from the quotes from the TI-SL president and the
final report to the donors, TI-SL was dependent upon TI for
program finances. This dependence on TI was a function of
TI’s organizational structure. Second, the sequence of esca-
lating complaints about the finances from the no-cost exten-
sion in July 2003 to the president’s humiliation and urgent
request in October 2003 indicates TI’s lack of managerial
responsiveness to its clients. Both factors are further dis-
cussed below.
TI’s Organizational Structure
The relationship between TI and the affiliate had an impact
on the outcomes discussed above. Specifically, three related
components of TI’s relationship with the affiliate are rele-
vant: (a) the size of the grant, (b) the absence of an expatriate,
and (c) financial dependence of TI-SL.
TI’s founding father was an icon in the civil rights move-
ment and notions of partnership, justice, and equality were
originally built into the movement organizations. This is
why the affiliate structure was created and why the affiliates
are independently run and managed organizations. That
affiliates are TI’s backbone has attained the status of myth.
According to the myth, affiliate TIs were started only upon
a request from local individuals, who had to gather an
interest group representative of the community that wanted
a local TI. Once the interest group was formed, TI and the
interest group would both search for funding. The interest
group was slowly developed into a board,  which hired
management and was independent of the TI board and
management. TI would offer technical training and assis-
tance to the local affiliate for a number of years and, once
sufficiently institutionalized, the local TI affiliate would be
a “graduate.” Thus, TI affiliates and TI were meant to be
partners in a common cause. However, over time this part-
nership came to mean different things to TI and the affili-
ates24 and it also came to be practiced in different ways
depending on the particular country affiliate and the spe-
cific programs being implemented.
One major defining structural factor was the size of the
grant. Typically, large-scale programs, involving multi-
million dollar, multiple year programs were funded by
government  aid organizations and  other large donors.
With large grant budgets came frequent travel and large
vested interest in terms of TI’s own survival and respon-
siveness to donor pressures to engage in frequent commu-
nications with the affiliate. A second related feature was
the presence of an expatriate TI international employee.
Typically, TI international advisors were in-country for
large-scale programs. When affiliate programs had expa-
triate advisors and large budgets, communication, travel
between TI and the host country, and TI leadership atten-
tion were usually greater in frequency and quality and
were also more likely to be sustained over time. On the
other hand, communications, travel, and attention to
programs in countries without the expatriate advisor and
concomitant  resources  were usually not as well main-
tained. In the case of the TI-SL program for sexual vio-
lence survivors, this was a relatively small program in the
overall budget of the organization (under US$200,000).
Thus, TI headquarters’ resources, time, and leadership
attention were rarely focused on the program. The third
major feature of the program that was embedded in TI’s
organizational structure was the combination of manage-
rial independence and financial dependence given to TI-
SL. Given TI and TI-SL’s history, TI-SL was an
independent organization, even though TI still controlled
the financial resources needed for implementation of the
program. Strong separation of communication and
managerial power between TI and TI-SL meant that com-
munication between various functions (such as finance in
the affiliate and finance at TI) and decision-making col-
laboration were not routinized. For example, the lack of
communication paths between the affiliate TI-SL and TI
can be noted in the need for a personal communication
from the president of TI-SL. However, financially, TI
exerted control over TI-SL’s ability to implement the
program.
On the one hand, expatriate managers come with their
own set of problems in international humanitarian work.25
On the other hand, expatriate managers may have advantages
in terms of their networks and understanding of parent
organizations that allow affiliate programs to operate more
effectively. Acknowledging and understanding some of the
trade-offs that may come with affiliate programs and expa-
triate managers is necessary for organizations such as TI and
its affiliates. It may be necessary to consider how to align the
managerial and financial aspects of a program in order to
improve effectiveness. For instance, when affiliates are not
sufficiently independent  in terms of managing their re-
sources  but are expected to be independent in terms of
running their programs, this may result in tying affiliates’
hands behind their backs and could impact the effectiveness
of programs. Furthermore, the erosion of trust and imbal-
ance of power between the local affiliate and headquarters
could negatively influence future work by the parent organi-
zation and the self-efficacy of the affiliate.
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TI’s Human Resource Management
The second aspect of the organizational context that may
have influenced TI’s diminished capacity to respond to its
clients is its human resource practices. In humanitarian aid
as well as other types of social service or non-profit work,
recent research suggests that human resource management
factors such as the lack of respect26 and justice27 employees
feel they receive from their managers within the organiza-
tion influence both employee burnout and client satisfac-
tion.28 In a similar fashion, the reference above in the final
report to donors to the “shared managerial lapse” may point
to human resource management within TI that could have
resulted in negatively affecting clients. Specifically, high
turnover and leadership within the organization may have
played a role in the organization’s lack of responsiveness to
clients.
During the time of the program (2002–2004), there were
severe human resource management issues within the or-
ganization. Of the seventeen people employed by the or-
ganization in that time-frame, nine employees voluntarily
resigned. That is a large exodus for a small organization to
experience. Seven of the employees who left had been in
program management, and two of them were senior execu-
tives. In addition, during this time, there were also numer-
ous meetings and communications concerning employee
dissatisfaction with management.29
The human resource management issues could have
been the result of internal organizational changes. First, the
founder of the organization has passed away in 2001. As
research on organizational transitions shows30 the death of
a founder has a profound effect on the organization. In the
case of NGOs, research indicates that many NGOs rely on
the presence of a charismatic founder-leader,31 and this
may result in organizational failure once the charismatic
founder is no longer present.32 Second, the organization
itself was divided between a subgroup of newly hired “out-
siders” in whom the history of the organization and its
founder had not been inculcated and a subgroup of long-
serving “insiders” who had been part of the original move-
ment and founding of the organization. For the latter, the
cult of the charismatic leader and the routinization of cha-
risma through rites, ceremonies, oral and written traditions
engendered strong loyalty and identification with the
founder and through that the organization33. For the for-
mer, it is likely that identification lay more with the profes-
sion of being an “aid” or “development” worker, rather
than TI per se.
In the case of TI’s more long-serving employees, the
emphasis on loyalty to the leader could be due to the
circumstances in which the movement and TI emerged.
Lewis34 notes that the context surrounding the formation
of British and Swedish labour unions led to differences in
the values that took hold in the organizations. British un-
ions, forged in an environment of threat and distrust, val-
ued insiders over outsiders, while Swedish unions were part
of the national polity and were therefore more bureaucratic
and professional. In a similar fashion, it is possible that the
context of TI’s founding affected the current values es-
poused within TI by the longer-serving group. The context
could be important in several ways. First, given the civil
rights movement and the atmosphere of social revolution
that pervaded black organizations and communities, it is
possible that loyalty in the guise of race became a primary
value.35 Over time, although race was no longer so critical
in the day-to-day development work of TI, the emphasis on
loyalty was retained. Second, the founder’s charismatic
leadership when directly experienced results in the personal
identification of followers with the leader.36 The direct
experience of charismatic leadership is quite different from
the experience created by the routinization of charisma
because charismatic leadership typically induces rever-
ence.37 One implication of this is that for the longer-serving
members of the organization who revered and identified
with the founder, personal loyalty to the leader could clearly
have been part of the founding imprint of TI. Using the
perspective of organizational blueprints, decisions made
early in the life of the organization influence its later trajec-
tory.38 When taken together, loyalty to the leader becomes
taken as shorthand for loyalty to the cause as perceived by
the individuals themselves.
On the other hand, as the organization expanded and
hired individuals who had not been through its founding
times or experienced the charisma of the founder directly,
the balance of employees with loyalty to the leader within
the organization changed. DiMaggio and Powell39 speak
of professionalization and professional norms as causing
isomorphism among organizations in an organizational
field. That is, increasing professionalization, measured by
hiring of individuals with academic credentials or posi-
tions in professional networks where organizational mod-
els are diffused, results in an organization resembling
others in its field. The influx of new individuals who had
worked in other organizations (and therefore belonged to
a professional network) resulted in normative pressures
on TI to change isomorphically regarding standards and
norms of professional conduct. However, although Di-
Maggio and Powell40 state that professionalization may
override the variations in tradition and control that shape
organizational behaviour, the process of overriding itself
could result in conflict. Similarly, if we consider the role
of subcultures in an organization41 rather than organiza-
tional culture as one “shared meaning,” we can see cul-
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tural conflict at TI between two subcultures: one promot-
ing a professional organization and another promoting a
loyalty-based system. Where loyalty and exchange built
on loyalty shaped organizational and individual out-
comes in the past, once professionalization began, organ-
izational and individual outcomes were expected to occur
based on professional norms. The transition in the or-
ganization and the conflicting expectations of both old
and new employees may be partially responsible for TI’s
human resource management issues. As one former em-
ployee stated:
TI is on the brink of collapse due to the loss of program staff… we
are struggling with program development, support and contrac-
tual needs as ONLY the three program VPs are [left]… the staff
whom we lost had years of in-house learning together with invest-
ment in their training through other opportunities.42
Both of these factors, the structural impediments to clear
communication with and independence of the affiliate and
the human resource management constraints, meant that
programs, such as TI-SL’s, suffered. The erosion of trust,
both between TI-SL and the women and girl survivors of
sexual violence in Sierra Leone and between TI and TI-SL,
is likely  to have  left both sets of TI’s clients in a more
vulnerable position regarding recovery.
Conclusions: An Opportunity for Learning
This paper has tried to show through a case-study approach
that both issues of organizational structure surrounding
affiliate programming and issues of human resource man-
agement can influence program outcomes. The vulnerabili-
ties of clients and employees in aid work are tied to the
organizational contexts in which they are embedded. Inter-
national programs are less able to be effective and clients are
more likely to be disaffected when they are embedded in
organizations with structural and managerial factors that act
as impediments to effective program implementation.
Of course, one could ask whether it is not the responsibility
of donor organizations to evaluate the extent to which NGOs
have capabilities to execute successful programs. But as
Church and Shouldice43 point out, the positive bias in evalu-
ation occurs at all levels of conflict resolution programs.
NGOs have a reason to put a positive spin on activities
because of dependence on donor funding; program manag-
ers in the donor agencies have a reason to positively evaluate
programs because they are judged based on grant perform-
ance; and donor agencies as a whole have a reason to put a
positive spin on activities because they need to justify their
funding from government sources to the public. The strength
of the negative outcomes, as highlighted in this paper, would
only be accessible from examining organizational records.
Many authors on NGO performance argue that rather than
project-based criteria for evaluations, learning should be the
goal of project evaluation.44 This paper is not meant to be a
project evaluation, but in the spirit of Edwards ane Hulme,45
it does point to opportunities for learning for both practitio-
ners and theorists.
A vulnerabilities framework suggests that the organiza-
tional context, not just the program, country, or client
factors should be included in an assessment of program
impact. Future research that examines the role of NGOs
on client outcomes in humanitarian aid and conflict situ-
ations should be cognizant of variables such as organiza-
t ional s tructure, cul ture , and human resource
management among others that may impact the vulner-
abilities of clients. From a practitioner’s perspective,
NGO managers and employees may need to think care-
fully about their responsibilities to clients in terms of their
own specific capacities for implementing programs. Un-
derstanding the structural and cultural context in which
programs are embedded will help program managers and
employees in NGOs figure out where the roadblocks and
opportunities are within their organizations to improve
their work with their clients.
Figure 1. Organizational Context
Influences on Client Outcomes
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